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Research on purchasers and suppliers of cash economy activity in Australia has been
conducted in the Research School of Social Sciences at the ANU using two data sets –
the first from a national survey conducted in July 2000, the second from a follow-up
survey conducted in January 2002. The data that have been analyzed so far provide the
following insights into cash economy behaviour and raise a number of questions for
further investigation.
(1) Australians who engage in cash economy activity can be divided into two groups
– what might be called, from a containment point of view, a hard target group and
what might be called a soft target group. The hard target group are repeat players
(they were involved in cash economy activity in 2000 and 2002). The soft targets
move in and out of the cash economy over quite short periods of time (18 months
in our research).  The survey data that we currently hold should not be generalized
to estimate the size of these groups.  It is likely that in a mail-out survey the hard
targets are under-represented.  We obtained a sufficient number of responses from
these groups, however, to gain some insight into the views of all groups about
taxation, the tax office and government.
(2) The hard target group of suppliers (work for cash-in-hand without declaring it to
the tax office) is most distinctive in its “estrangement” from the tax office. They
are dismissive of the authority of the tax office, question the value of having a tax
system, feel no shame or guilt about being caught for tax evasion, feel that the tax
office does not treat them respectfully, and rate their chances of being caught as
relatively low.
(3) Purchasers (pay others cash-in-hand) in the hard target group share many of these
views – they feel that the tax office does not treat them well, feel no shame or
guilt at the prospect of being caught for tax evasion, and rate their chances of
being caught for tax evasion as relatively low.  Purchasers differ from suppliers,
however, in believing that the tax system can work for the benefit of all - but they
perceive weaknesses in the way the system is currently working. Most notably,
they see those in higher socio-economic groups as not paying their fair share of
tax. It’s almost as if purchasers see themselves as helping out those who do not
have access to the tax avoidance opportunities that come with social and
economic privilege.
(4) In order to contain cash economy activity among the hard target group it is
important to recognize that the purchaser-supplier relationship is one that is
“morally disconnected” from regulators, enforcement and the legitimacy of
government authority. It should not be thought of as an “under class” because
those with wealth, education and social status are part of this group.  But it is a
group that is marginalized in terms of seeing the system of governance as being
legitimate and operating with integrity. Both the hard target purchaser and
supplier groups lack regard for law and government authority – albeit for different
reasons. A question for the future is whether the problems posed by the hard
target group extend beyond taxation into the territory of other government
agencies.  The hard target group show all the signs of being defiant when faced
with government authority more generally.  If this turns out to be the case, there is
an important implication for containment of the cash economy problem.  While
the tax office needs to continue doing its job with the utmost integrity, it needs to
be doing so as part of a whole of government approach to restoring Australians’
confidence in the system of governance.
(5) The soft target group of purchasers and suppliers appear, in most respects, to be
no different from Australians who have never engaged in cash economy activity.
The differences that do occur relate to their perceptions of what others think about
cash economy activity and their assessment of the chances of being caught. Those
who are in and out of the cash economy think that others in the community regard
cash economy activity as a normal part of daily life and they think that there is a
fair chance of not getting caught.  Possibly the driving force here is opportunity
and the economic circumstances in which people find themselves. We will be
looking at this more closely in the future.  But to explain the idea further as a
discussion point, having a cash economy job may be better than having no job at
all or having a job that is too far away from home or a job that offers unsuitable
hours.  From a providers’ perspective, it may be that having someone working for
cash-in-hand gives flexibility, or in the case of a business, opportunity for
incremental growth in a competitive environment.  In short, the transients, as
suppliers or purchasers, may be struggling.  There is some evidence to suggest
that transient participants in the cash economy are dissatisfied with the way
government spends taxpayers’ money.
(6) Cash economy activity should not be analyzed as an isolated problem.
Participation in the cash economy is related to tax avoidance and tax evasion.
Where tolerance of avoidance is high, evasion of all kinds will follow, cash
economy activity simply being the type of evasion that is hardest for the
authorities to track and the most accessible to those without the money to opt for
the avoidance route.  There is some evidence from overseas that cash economy
activity is a reflection of the health of the democracy itself. Further research in
Australia is needed to address this issue.
(7) It is also worth pointing out that our data clearly demonstrate that the glue for a
tax system is moral obligation or the general belief that all of us, as Australians,
should share the responsibility of paying our tax with good will.  A marker of the
strength of moral obligation in a society is that people who cooperate with the tax
office report that they would feel guilty and ashamed if they were caught for tax
evasion. Most Australians express both moral obligation and guilt/shame over tax
evasion.  Interestingly, while most people describe themselves as being of this
mind, they feel that they are alone.  They believe that others don’t value the tax
system and taxpaying as highly as they do and they feel generally disillusioned
with the state of Australia’s democracy. For this reason, moral obligation needs to
be protected and encouraged wherever possible. A first and very easy step is to
acknowledge the voices of those who are supporting the tax system.  The use of
penalties, in particular, a graduated system of penalties (from civil to criminal) is
also important in signaling to the community that compliance with tax law is
valued and considered important by government and the community.  What this
set of research findings means for practice is that self-regulation (through
conscience) is the best and most efficient regulatory strategy and needs to be
reinforced at every opportunity.  At the same time, enforcement and penalties
need to be a visible back-up in circumstances where self-regulation has been
given a chance and has clearly failed.  This is the central proposition in the ATO
Compliance Model.
